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I. INTRODUCTION 
Class actions, especially those filed in or removed to federal 
court, are ever more prominent in the landscape of modern 
American litigation.1  Since Congress passed the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAFA), which vastly expanded diversity jurisdiction in 
the context of class actions,2 district courts have seen a veritable 
explosion of class action diversity filings and removals.3  In the Third 
Circuit alone, district courts have experienced an almost fourfold 
increase in such actions in the wake of CAFA’s passage.4 
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thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn and fellow members of the Seton Hall Law Review 
for their time, advice, and editorial assistance. 
 1  See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action 
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1723, 1754 (2008) (“[F]ederal courts have seen an increase in diversity 
removals and, especially, original proceedings in the post-CAFA period as a result of 
the expansion of the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”). 
 2  Federal district courts now possess, inter alia, original jurisdiction over classes 
whose members number 100 or more and whose claims, in the aggregate, exceed $5 
million.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B) (2006).  
 3  Overall, the average number of post-CAFA federal class actions filed and 
removed per month more than doubled.  See Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1723; 
see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROGRESS REPORT 
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 1 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/cafa1107.pdf/$file/cafa1107.pdf.  Additionally, according to the Federal Judicial 
Center, “reliable data on class action activity in most state court systems simply do not 
exist.”  Id. at 4.  Nevertheless, CAFA aside, there appears to be an upward trend in 
state class action filings as well.  Id. at 4–5. 
 4  Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1760.  This relatively large increase in the 
Third Circuit has generally been attributed to non-CAFA factors, such as a more 
plaintiff-friendly attitude toward class certification.  Id. at 1761.  See generally EMERY G. 
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION 
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 22 (2008), available at 
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafa0408.pdf.  One recent study of 
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With the growing salience of class actions to the federal docket, 
the necessity of their efficient and timely adjudication cannot be 
overstated.  The federal judiciary is notoriously overburdened,5  and 
any opportunity to alleviate that burden should be seized upon.  
Conversely, any attempt to needlessly exacerbate that burden should 
be avoided. 
Notwithstanding dismissals and state court remands, federal 
diversity class actions are most commonly concluded through 
settlements.6  In fact, one recent quantitative study of over 250 class 
actions noted that in every case where a putative class was certified, a 
settlement was eventually negotiated and approved.7  Therefore, to 
 
securities class actions emphasizes the point that, immediately post-CAFA, federal 
filings dramatically increased.  Dr. Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in 
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2013 Full-Year in Review, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 
2 (Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://www.nera.com 
/nera-files/PUB_2013_Year_End_Trends_1.2014.pdf.  In 2006, the year immediately 
following CAFA’s passage, there were 132 federal securities class actions filed.  Id.  By 
2008, that number had swelled to 245.  Id.  In the years since, though, the post-CAFA 
boom appears to have leveled out; but case filings have remained above 200 every 
year since 2008.  Id. 
 5  See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and 
Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473 (2009).  
According to Circuit Judge O’Scannlain, the caseload facing federal district judges is 
“crushing,” and “the actual burden [on appellate courts] is even greater than the raw 
numbers suggest.”  Id. at 475; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Case Glut 
Impedes Civil Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052970204505304577001771159867642.html (“‘Civil litigation has 
ground to a halt,’ [District] Judge McCuskey said, adding that ‘you’ve got a right to 
sue but you do not get a right to a speedy jury trial.’”).  Indeed, some congressional 
debate surrounding the passage of CAFA dealt with the practical effect it would have 
on the federal courts.  Lee & Willging, supra note 1, at 1732–33.  For a recent 
examination of the effect the federal budget sequester is having on the courts, see 
Dahlia Lithwick, Even Before the Shutdown, Federal Courts Had Already Been Crippled By 
the Sequester, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/ 
federal_courts_and_shutdown_the_sequester_had_already_crippled_american.html 
(“One of the great underreported outrages of the past year is the degree to which 
the judicial branch has been limping along on inadequate funds.  Following 
sequestration last March, $350 million was stripped from the courts’ budget.  The net 
result has been a disaster in the administration of justice in this country.”).  
 6  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM 
PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 6 (2008) (sampling over 
250 cases).  Indeed, settlement is an overwhelmingly prevalent disposition in civil 
litigation in general.  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the 
Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 111 (2009). 
 7  Lee & Willging, supra note 6, at 11.  This was so regardless of whether 
certification came in conjunction with, or separately from, settlement approval.  Id. 
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mitigate the growing pressure on the federal judiciary, courts should 
eschew the formation of unnecessary impediments to either the 
initial approval or the finalization of class action settlements. 
This Comment, specifically, argues against one such 
impediment: the notion that structurally inadequate8 class action 
settlements must be reversed even where curing this inadequacy will 
not increase the settling class’s ultimate financial recovery.  The 
Comment focuses a series of cases (Dewey I, Dewey II, and Dewey III) in 
which the United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit forced 
such a reversal, notwithstanding the fact that the reworked settlement 
provided no additional monetary advantage to any class members. 
Part II of this Comment provides some preliminary factual 
background to these cases.  Part III delineates some of the general 
requirements and procedures for—along with fundamental policies 
behind—settling class actions.  Next, Part IV further explores the 
specific settlement at issue in the Dewey cases.  And Part V explores 
the underlying source of the counterintuitive doctrine espoused by 
the Third Circuit in Dewey II, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor.9 
Finally, Part VI asserts that courts should not reverse class action 
settlements for mere structural inadequacy, especially of the kind as 
was at issue in the Dewey cases.  Instead, when faced with such errors 
at the district court level, appellate courts should apply the harmless 
error doctrine.  That is, if changing the language of the settlement to 
comply with the law will not alter the class members’ financial 
recovery, then the courts of appeals should let the settlement stand. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In July of 2002, the sky unleashed a heavy rainstorm on John M. 
Dewey’s new Volkswagen Passat.10  The sunroof of the car, which was 
supposed to drain water out of the vehicle, instead rerouted the 
 
 8  “Structurally inadequate” and “procedurally inadequate” are used in this 
Comment as interchangeable labels for settlements that, while in technical violation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions, nevertheless 
monetarily protected the interests of all class members as if those Rules had been 
met.  See infra Part III. 
 9  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 10  Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 17–18, Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 07CV02249), 2007 WL 2260530 
[hereinafter First Complaint]. 
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downpour into the car, flooding the rear passenger-side floorboards.11  
From there, water leaked into parts of the automatic transmission 
and, in conjunction with other damage, caused the car to break 
down.12 
In February of 2006, Francis Nowicki purchased a pre-owned 
2002 Audi A6 Quattro.13  In March of 2008, Mr. Nowicki opened the 
door to his car and noticed that half a foot of water had frozen on the 
passenger-side floor.14  Mr. Nowicki removed as much of the ice and 
water as he could and began driving.15  But as he drove, the car 
started to shake violently.16  Pulling into a rest stop to address the 
issue, he eventually called a tow truck.17 
The experiences of Messrs. Dewey and Nowicki were by no 
means unique.  In response, they and a group of similarly aggrieved 
car owners filed a class action,18 alleging that certain Volkswagen and 
Audi19 models were defectively designed.20  The parties engaged in 
years of extensive class-certification and merits discovery.21  
 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. at ¶¶ 4, 17–18. 
 13  Fourth Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 31, Dewey v. Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v. 
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 07CV02249), 2008 
WL 8039626 [hereinafter Fourth Complaint]. 
 14  Id. at ¶ 33. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  First Complaint. 
 19  The broader corporate entity that oversees both car brands is known as the 
Volkswagen Group (“Group”).  The Group, as it calls itself, directly controls the 
manufacturing of the Volkswagen and Audi lines, as well as Bentley, Bugatti, and 
Lamborghini, among others.  Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Facts and Figures 
Navigator 2012, 2 (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/ 
info_center/en/publications/2012/03/navigator-2012—-facts-and-
figures.bin.html/binarystorageitem/ 
file/Navigator_21_09_2012_en_WEB.pdf. 
 20  First Complaint, at ¶ 18. 
 21  Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (D.N.J. 2010) 
(Dewey I) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 
F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (Dewey II).  By way of general introduction, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure anticipate class certification—meaning, judicial approval of the 
very structure of the lawsuit as representative—as a step primary to conclusions on 
the merits (or by settlement).  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  Thus, some courts go so 
far as to stay merits discovery until after class certification.  1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:10 (9th ed. 2012).  Although this type of 
discovery bifurcation can help limit needless litigation in the event class certification 
is denied, many courts ignore this potential benefit because of the risk of needless 
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Eventually, in early 2010, the plaintiff class and the defendants moved 
jointly for preliminary approval of a settlement.22 
The parties sent notice of the impending settlement to over 5 
million class members.23  As a result, 203 class members filed 
objections to the settlement.24  The district court exhaustively 
scrutinized every component of the settlement, and analyzed each 
objection.25  Subsequently, on July 30, 2010, in Dewey v. Volkswagen of 
America (“Dewey I”), the court approved the settlement.26 
On May 31, 2012, in Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (“Dewey 
II”), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district 
court’s approval of the settlement.27  According to the Third Circuit, 
the structure of the settlement was such that the class representatives 
did not adequately represent the class as a whole.28  The court 
therefore reversed the settlement approval and remanded to the 
district court to restructure the settlement so as to fairly account for 
 
disputes over the precise line between facts related to merits and facts related to 
certification.  Id.  Here, discovery on both certification and merits proceeded until 
settlement negotiations began.  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
 22  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 560.  As will be discussed further, unlike traditional 
lawsuits—which may be settled without judicial sanction—parties to a class action 
may only settle with court approval.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  The specific nature of the 
settlement will be described infra, in Part IV.  For now, this settlement provided a 
number of types of relief; but, most relevant for this Comment, was the creation of 
an $8 million fund from which class members could seek compensation for damaged 
cars.  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189. 
 23  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
 24  Id.  The larger purposes behind class action settlement approvals, and the role 
of objectors in those approvals, will be examined in more detail below.  Preliminarily, 
though, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit any class member to object to 
proposed settlements.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).  The approving district court uses 
these objections to measure the fairness of the settlement.  See 2 JOSEPH M. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:10 (9th ed. 2012); see also In re Gen. 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“In an effort to measure the class’s own reaction to the settlement’s terms 
directly, courts look to the number and vociferousness of the objectors.”). 
 25  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 563–615. 
 26  Id. at 616.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1), supra note 21, as to the requirements 
of class certification being prerequisites to any conclusion to litigation, either by way 
of a judgment or settlement.  Common practice, therefore, is for classes to be 
deemed preliminarily certified where settling defendants and plaintiffs support 
certification.  See generally 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 
6:7 (9th ed. 2012).  Then, when the final fairness hearing is held on the acceptability 
of the settlement—after notice of the settlement has been given to class members 
and objectors have had opportunity to file objections—a proper analysis of class 
certification is simultaneously undertaken.  Id. 
 27  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 190.  
 28  Id. 
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the interests of the entire class.29 
Finally, on December 14, 2012, in yet another case captioned 
Dewey v. Volkswagen of America (“Dewey III”), the district court approved 
a new settlement agreement, restructured according to the guidelines 
set forth by the Third Circuit.30 
Though relatively rare, appellate reversals of class action 
settlement approvals do not themselves raise novel issues.31  Instead, 
what makes this series of cases unique is the fact that, though 
structurally inadequate, the original approved settlement would still 
have functionally awarded the non-representative class members the 
funds to which they were entitled.32 
Put a different way, the Third Circuit reversed because the 
original settlement did not incorporate certain requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that safeguard the rights of the 
absent class members who do not directly participate in the 
negotiation of the settlement.33  But even with this procedural 
inadequacy, the original settlement afforded the absent class 
members the same financial recovery they would have received—and, 
in fact, did receive—under the revised settlement.34  Whether 
structurally appropriate or not, both the adequately and inadequately 
represented class members benefited under the original settlement—
and benefited in such a way as to make their respective monetary 
recoveries equal in fact.35 
In a footnote, the Third Circuit acknowledged this curiosity and 
offhandedly dismissed it, instead suggesting that the ultimate lack of 
 
 29  Id.  
 30  Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 374 (D.N.J. 
2012). 
 31  For example, in Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 
2002), the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge abused his discretion in 
approving a settlement between consumers and a tax preparation company and a 
bank.  There, the inadequacy involved the district judge’s insufficient scrutiny of the 
interactions between class representatives’ attorneys and the defendants, opening the 
door to the possibility of a collusive effect between these parties at the expense of the 
class as a whole.  Id. at 282–83.  Or, for another example, in Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 
F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit reversed approval of a class action 
settlement based, first, on an incorrect methodology for calculating attorneys’ fees, 
and, second, on a wildly disparate—and unjustified—differential between monetary 
recovery for named class members and unnamed class members. 
 32  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. 
 33  Id. at 189. 
 34  Id.  See also Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 
(D.N.J. 2012); infra note 139. 
 35  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189. 
LEVY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:21 PM 
2014] COMMENT 637 
 
a monetary disparity between the old and new settlements was 
essentially irrelevant.36  The structural inadequacy was sufficient to 
warrant reversal.37 
The notion that class action settlements with only structural 
inadequacies should be reversed, however, risks imposing 
unnecessary litigation costs, especially in the context of massive class 
action lawsuits.  The gargantuan effort required by parties to obtain 
settlements in these cases should not be so easily undermined.38  
Certainly, district court decisions must be reviewable; occasionally, 
they warrant reversal.39  Indeed, the Federal Rules’ structural 
requirements protect all class members and should not be ignored in 
the first instance.  But courts of appeals must also engage in cautious 
analysis before reversing a sensitively negotiated and judicially 
sanctioned settlement.40 
III. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND THE ADEQUACY REQUIREMENT 
As a framework for complex litigation, the class action has been 
described as “probably the most powerful joinder device in the 
United States.”41  Because of this power—rooted in the unique 
phenomenon of being able to bind “absent class members”—the 
modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure built various procedural 
protections into the class action.42 
 
 36  Id. at 189 n.19. 
 37  Id. 
 38  See infra text accompanying notes 97–100. 
 39  See supra note 31. 
 40  Indeed, some courts of appeals delineate a standard of review for class action 
settlements that appears to go beyond standard abuse of discretion analysis.  See, e.g., 
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court’s final 
determination to approve the settlement should be reversed only upon a strong 
showing that the district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.”) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 
(4th Cir. 1975) (“So long as the record before [the trial court] is adequate to reach 
an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should 
the claim be litigated and form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense and 
likely duration of such litigation, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair 
assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise, [the settlement should not 
be overturned].”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Admittedly, the Third Circuit 
does not appear to adopt this framework.  See, e.g., Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 182; In re 
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 41  STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 193 (2006). 
 42  These protections are found throughout Rule 23, the rule governing class 
actions.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). 
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At the heart of the class action is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a),43 which delineates the four basic requirements of this type of 
group litigation.44  Each of these is fundamental, but Rule 23(a)(4), 
“[t]he adequacy of the class’s representation[,] is the sine qua non of 
modern class-action practice.”45  Stated differently: 
The class action is an awkward device, requiring careful 
judicial supervision, because the fate of the class members is 
to a considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff 
(or handful of plaintiffs, when . . . there is more than one 
class representative) whom the other members of the class 
may not know and who may not be able or willing to be an 
adequate fiduciary of their interests.46 
By definition, a class action precludes all plaintiffs from being active 
litigants and advocates for their interests.  Absent class members must 
rely on the class representatives—those members of the class that are 
active participants in the suit—to protect their interests as well.  By 
way of illustration, one fear regarding the adequacy of representation 
concerns so called “red-carpeting.”47  Judges carefully scrutinize fee 
 
 43  As a historical note, it is worth stating here that the modern class action has its 
roots in certain equitable principles born of English common law.  And the notion 
that in some limited circumstances, parties to a case could bind other parties found 
expression in American law as well, with early landmark cases such as Smith v. 
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853), and Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 
U.S. 356, 367 (1921).  These, in turn, gave way to a more sophisticated formulation 
for class actions in the 1938 Federal Rules and, subsequently, a revision in 1966 that 
brought Rule 23 into existence.  See SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 41, at 194–95. 
 44  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable [“numerosity”]; (2) there are questions 
of law or fact common to the class [“commonality”]; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [“typicality”]; 
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class [“adequacy”].”).   
 45  THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 646 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 46  Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 47  32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1947 (2013) (citing Sutter v. Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 966 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)).  See, e.g., 
Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is 
also a conflict inherent in cases like this one, where fees are paid by a quondam 
adversary from its own funds—the danger being that the lawyers might urge a class 
settlement at a low figure or on less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet 
treatment on fees.”); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(“Because of the potential for a collusive settlement, a sellout of a highly meritorious 
claim, or a settlement that ignores the interests of minority class members, the 
district judge has a heavy duty to ensure that any settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and 
adequate’ and that the fee awarded plaintiffs’ counsel is entirely appropriate.”). 
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awards for counsel of the class representatives.48  Courts worry about 
these attorneys under-advocating for the class when negotiating with 
defendants’ counsel, securing a higher fee award in exchange for 
lower class compensation.49  Thus, it is essential that class counsel—as 
well as class representatives—be able to adequately represent the class 
as a whole.  Considering the potential risks to absent class members, 
it is no wonder that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified 
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with 
the court’s approval.”50 
IV. DEWEY V. VOLKSWAGEN: THE SAGA OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
As mentioned in Part II, plaintiffs filed a class action against 
Volkswagen for alleged water-related defects in certain Volkswagen 
and Audi models.  Like so many others,51 this suit never went to trial.  
Instead, in early 2010, the parties petitioned the court for approval of 
a settlement agreement. 
A. Dewey I: Approval of the First Settlement Agreement 
On July 30, 2010, the district court approved the terms of the 
aforementioned settlement.52  Essentially, the settlement provided the 
plaintiff class members with three types of relief.53  First, there was an 
educational component;54 all class members were to be sent 
preventative maintenance information on how to properly inspect 
and clean the defective sunroofs.55  Second, the settlement designated 
certain car models for free servicing from any authorized Volkswagen 
dealer.56  And third, an $8 million fund was created to reimburse class 
members for certain repairs.57 
 
 48  See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1947. 
 49  Id. (citing Sutter, 966 A.2d at 508). A similar fear exists concerning 
underhanded agreements between class counsel and class representatives, whereby the 
attorneys and the class representatives secure substantial payouts for themselves, 
sidelining absent class members.  See id. 
 50  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  Note also that such approval is only permitted “after a 
hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  This is generally referred 
to as the “final fairness hearing.” 
 51  See supra text accompanying notes 6–7. 
 52  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 53  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 175–176. 
 54  Id. at 175. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
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This $8 million fund was the subject of the successful objection 
and the Third Circuit’s reversal.58  All told, there were approximately 
five million class members, collective owners of over three million 
cars.59  Though all class members were seeking rectification for 
appreciably similar defects, these three million cars consisted of a 
number of vehicle models and years.60  Depending on the vehicle 
owned, the settlement divided the class members into two groups: the 
“reimbursement group,” and the “residual group.”61  The 
reimbursement group was afforded the ability to presently receive 
reimbursement from the $8 million fund for certain damages.62  Any 
money remaining in the fund after class members in the 
reimbursement group made their claims would be made available to 
those in the residual group.63 
According to the district court, this division was “based on 
objective criteria, namely the past frequency of failure and the design 
of the vehicles.”64  In other words, cars in the reimbursement group 
more frequently experienced problems than those in the residual 
group.65 
 
 58  Id. at 189. 
 59  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 565. 
 60  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 174. 
 61  Id. at 174–175. 
 62  Id. at 173. 
 63  Id.  Administratively, the fund was capped at $8 million.  Id.  The settlement 
provided that if this were insufficient to satisfy claims in the reimbursement group, 
the class members in that group would only receive pro rata recovery, theoretically 
leaving class members in the residual group with nothing.  Id. at 176.  Similarly, if the 
$8 million were to be sufficient to satisfy all claims in the reimbursement group, but 
not all claims in the residual group, reimbursement group class members would 
receive full recovery and residual group class members would then receive pro rata 
recovery.  Id.  And, as will be noted below, if the $8 million fund were to be sufficient 
to cover all claims by all class members, leaving some unclaimed amount, the 
settlement also provided for the “donation of all unclaimed reimbursement funds to 
an educational, charitable, or research facility after five years.”  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 
2d at 561. 
 64  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
 65  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 187.  It is worth noting that the objectors, inter alia, also 
objected to the factual contention that cars in the residual group necessarily saw 
reduced claims: 
There appears to be some dispute over whether or not the assignment 
of individual plaintiffs was actually based, as representative plaintiffs 
allege, on the relevant claims rates.  The . . . Objectors note several 
outlier car models in the residual group with higher claims rates than 
certain models in the reimbursement group.  We need not address this 
issue because we conclude that even if representative plaintiffs did 
assign cars into the various groups based on claims rates, they still 
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B. Dewey II: Reversal of the Settlement Approval 
On May 31, 2012, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s 
approval of the settlement.66  The circuit found that dividing class 
members into reimbursement and residual groups was a generally 
acceptable framework for the administration of the settlement 
funds.67  Nevertheless, in this case, the appellate court concluded that 
the division demonstrated a fatal flaw in the adequacy of the class’s 
representation.68 
The difference between potential claims rates for owners of cars 
in the reimbursement group and those in the residual group was not 
as clear-cut as the lower court opinion suggested.69  The sorting of car 
models into one group or another was, to borrow the Third Circuit’s 
phrasing, a “line-drawing exercise.”70  The difference in claims rates 
was not an either/or proposition; rather, the different cars rested 
along a spectrum.71  But—because whichever class members wound 
up in the reimbursement group would be more advantageously 
poised to recover from the fund—“[e]very plaintiff in the class had 
an incentive to maximize the number of plaintiffs in the residual 
group, while ensuring that they themselves were in the 
reimbursement group.”72  Thus, class representatives had an incentive 
to draw the line just below whichever car models they happened to 
own, thereby sidelining absent class members and arbitrarily 
relegating them to the residual group.73 
Again, the problem was not that there was a line to draw.  
Instead, the settlement presented deficiencies in representation 
 
could not adequately represent the class. 
Id. at 187 n.17.  Both the Third Circuit’s sidelining of the issue, and this insistence 
that even proper divisions would not have sufficed, further compound the primacy of 
structure over substance in the Third Circuit’s analysis. 
 66  Id. at 170. 
 67  Id. at 188.  Indeed, the Third Circuit notes Volkswagen’s reliance on In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009).  There, the general 
acceptability of such recovery schemes was explicitly sanctioned: “This is simply a 
reflection of the extent of the injury that certain class members incurred and does 
not clearly suggest that the class members had antagonistic interests. . . . [It] merely 
created a structure for ensuring that reimbursement is tied to the extent of 
damages.”  In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 272. 
 68  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 188. 
 69  Id. at 187; see also supra note 65. 
 70  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 187. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 187–88. 
 73  Id. at 188. 
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because of “who drew the line.”74  As it happened, there was not a 
single class representative in the residual group.75  A number of class 
members from the residual group then objected and the district 
court did, in fact, briefly address the objectors’ contentions: 
[T]he division of class members into subclasses receiving 
different benefits based upon the type of vehicle they own 
does not necessarily render the settlement unfair or 
unreasonable, nor does it show a conflict of interest that 
renders the class representatives unable to adequately 
represent the class.76 
Notwithstanding this and the other many objections, the court 
approved the settlement.77 
The Third Circuit, however, pointed out that “the interests of 
the representative plaintiffs and the interests of the residual group 
aligned in opposing directions.”78  According to the circuit, this 
violated the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy requirement.79  Therefore, the 
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s approval of the settlement.80  
The appellate court remanded the case to the district court, 
recommending that the revised settlement eliminate the 
reimbursement and residual groups entirely.81  Thus, all plaintiffs 
could then seek recovery from the $8 million fund without some class 
 
 74  Id. at 188–89. 
 75  Id. at 187. 
 76  Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 579–80 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 77  Id. at 616. 
 78  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 188. 
 79  Id. at 190. 
 80  Id.  Procedurally, it was not the approval of the settlement that was reversed.  
See id. at 189.  The district court had followed common practice, simultaneously 
certifying the class and approving the settlement.  See supra note 26.  The Third 
Circuit technically reversed for a violation of Rule 23(a) (the portion of the rule that 
goes to class certification) and not Rule 23(e) (the portion of the rule that directly 
deals with settlement certification); and the reversal was thus on the holding of Dewey 
I that specifically dealt with class certification.  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 (“We will 
reverse the District Court’s order certifying the class because the representative 
plaintiffs fail to satisfy the adequacy requirement in Rule 23(a)(4).”).  Still, in this 
case, as in others similar in nature, class certification and settlement approval are 
inexorably linked and, indeed, often conflated in both the district court and circuit 
court opinions.  Therefore, for clarity’s sake, the Comment will refer to the reversal 
of the settlement approval, and not of class certification.  Finally, it is also worth 
noting that adequacy is found directly within Rule 23(e), though, as is common, the 
Third Circuit emphasizes the reversal as going to Rule 23(a).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e)(2). 
 81  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189–90. 
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members having priority over others.82 
C. Footnote 19: The Troubling Doctrinal Proposition Underlying Dewey 
II 
As straightforward as this reversal may appear on its face, the 
analysis went beyond a simple application of Rule 23(a)(4).  Under 
the terms of the original settlement, the three million cars were not 
evenly divided into the reimbursement and residual groups.83  
Instead, the reimbursement group was approximately double that of 
the residual group.84  Assuming a 100% claims rate, the 
reimbursement group of approximately two million cars would seek 
$16 million from the fund.85  Clearly, this would exhaust an 
insufficient $8 million fund, leaving nothing for the residual 
claimants and even limiting recovery for those in the reimbursement 
group.86  At first blush, this report underscores the inherent 
unfairness of the settlement and the inadequacy of representation for 
the absent class members belonging to the residual. 
As early as in Dewey I, however, the district court recognized that 
it was an “unfounded assumption that 100% of the class would seek 
out the benefits.”87  Indeed, though class members were notified of 
the settlement while the appeal was pending, by the time the Third 
Circuit promulgated its opinion in Dewey II, claims rates were so low 
that “[r]epresentative plaintiffs project[ed] that the $8 million 
reimbursement fund will be sufficient to satisfy the claims of those in the 
reimbursement group and the residual group, if projected claim rates hold 
true.”88 
 
 82  Id.  Technically, the Third Circuit made two different recommendations to the 
district court for it to consider on remand.  Id.  First, as already noted, the parties 
could eliminate the reimbursement and residual groups.  Id.  As will be made clear, 
the restructured settlement approved by the district court in Dewey v. Volkswagen of 
Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–377 (D.N.J. 2012) essentially used this formulation.  
The Third Circuit did, however, offer an alternative arrangement where, instead of 
certifying one class with two subgroups, the district court could create two subclasses 
with two sets of representative plaintiffs.  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189–90. 
 83  Report of Dr. George C. Eads, Senior Consultant, CRA Charles River 
Associates, Inc. at 4, Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 728 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D.N.J. 2010) 
(No. 07-cv-2249), 2010 WL 3289031.  Dr. Eads explained that, of the total number of 
approximately three million cars, 1,084,838 were in the residual group.  Id. at ¶ III.a. 
 84  Id. at ¶ III.a.  
 85  Id. 
 86  Id.  The reimbursement group would be forced to accept only pro rata 
recovery, as mentioned supra note 63. 
 87  Dewey I, 728 F. Supp. 2d 546, 615 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 88  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 (emphasis added). 
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The Third Circuit accepted this valuation; in recommending to 
the district court that the new settlement simply eliminate the group 
distinctions,89 the circuit noted, “there appears to be no need to 
create the residual group.”90  On this point, the circuit added a 
footnote [“Footnote 19”], around which this Comment is ultimately 
constructed: 
Volkswagen appears to suggest that the fact that the residual 
is likely sufficient to satisfy the claims arising out of the 
residual group implies that the representative plaintiffs 
adequately represented the class.  Such an argument was 
made in Amchem, and was explicitly rejected by the Supreme 
Court.91  The adequacy requirement provides structural 
protections during the process of bargaining for settlement.  
The fact that the stars aligned and the class members’ 
interests were not actually damaged does not permit 
representative plaintiffs to bypass structural requirements.92 
D. Dewey III: The Restructured Settlement 
On December 14, 2012, the district court approved the 
restructured settlement.93  This modified agreement followed the 
recommendations of the Third Circuit, doing away with the 
reimbursement/residual distinction.94  Echoing the implications of 
Footnote 19 in Dewey II, the district court in Dewey III noted that, of 
the $8 million in the fund, only $5 million was actually claimed by 
class members in the former reimbursement group.95  Moreover, the 
value of claims from the former residual group was projected to be 
only “between $466,048.80 and $782,296.20.”96  Said differently, the 
stars aligned.  The residual class members were not actually harmed 
in the first settlement agreement. 
Furthermore, in addition to not offering class members 
increased recovery, the process of restricting the settlement imposed 
significant costs on both the parties and the court.  Months were 
 
 89  See supra note 83. 
 90  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189. 
 91  A direct quote from Amchem, omitted here for lack of context but crucial to 
the analysis below, can be found infra text accompanying note 125. 
 92  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. 
 93  Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.J. 2012). 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 393 n.21. 
 96  Id. 
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spent reworking the terms of the settlement.97  The district court 
returned to motion practice on this case, and held several lengthy 
hearings, both in-person and over the phone.98  Similar to the months 
of litigation before Dewey I, the court opened up the redrafted 
settlement to a whole new round of objections, several which had to 
be addressed at length in Dewey III.99  Attorneys’ fee awards increased 
by over $100,000.100 
Clearly, the costs of reversal were significant.  To no one’s 
surprise (including the Third Circuit), the revised settlement resulted 
in the same recovery for the former residual class members.  
Regardless, however, the Third Circuit saw it necessary to reverse. 
The glaring question, then, is why? 
V. AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. V. WINDSOR: PRELUDE TO DEWEY II 
A. Explaining Amchem 
“No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this 
one,” wrote the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.101 
Before the Court in Amchem was a massive settlement between 
plaintiffs and a consortium of twenty asbestos products 
manufacturers.102  Asbestos has a long and complicated relationship 
 
 97  More significant, perhaps, than the months between Dewey II and Dewey III are 
the years between Dewey I and Dewey III.  This protracted appeals process is certainly 
palatable where the outcome is tangibly beneficial.  But in the context of the 
outcome of Dewey III, the cost is simply too high. 
 98  See, e.g., id. at 377, 378 n.5, 379 n.9, 380. 
 99  Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 388 (D.N.J. 
2012). 
 100  Id. at 390.  Furthermore, considering traditional methodologies for the 
calculations of such awards, this increase was modest.  Id. at 390–95.  Here, possibly 
due to this case’s already protracted nature, the inarguably successful objectors’ 
attorneys sought fractions of the fees (and expenses) they claimed to have incurred.  
Id.  
 101  521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997).  It is worth noting that Amchem, in general, was a 
landmark case for class action settlement certification.  See, e.g., SUBRIN & WOO, supra 
note 41, at 207.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Amchem, various lower courts had 
relaxed the requirements of Rule 23(a) in the context of certification for the 
purposes of settlement.  See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996); 
White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994); Malchman v. Davis, 761 
F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985).  The promulgation of Amchem, however, renewed the 
strength of Rule 23(a) in the context of Rule 23(e) settlement approvals.  Amchem, 
521 U.S. at 621 (“[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, 
eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the 
impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed.”). 
 102  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599–600. 
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to Western society’s advancement.103  The severity of the dark 
aftermath of global exposure to asbestos was perhaps matched only 
by the glowing reputation it boasted before being sullied: “Seemingly 
blessed with useful attributes, such as softness, flexibility and 
resistance to fire, asbestos was once seen as the silk of a magical 
mineral world.”104  The use of asbestos,105 consisting of a number of 
minerals used for hundreds of years in manufacturing and 
construction, skyrocketed toward the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries.106  The scientific community 
began publicizing the potential health hazards associated with 
asbestos as early as the 1930s.107  But cancer and other asbestos-related 
diseases only manifest in earnest after decades of exposure.108  Thus, 
the then-ubiquitous material’s effects resulted in a flood of lawsuits by 
the 1970s.109 
In 1990, a report issued by the United States Judicial Conference 
Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation determined that this flood 
of cases could only efficiently be managed through legislative reform 
at the federal level.110  While Congress did not undertake any such 
action, the federal judiciary, acting through the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, transferred all filed asbestos cases not yet on 
trial to one district.111  Subsequent to this transfer and consolidation, 
the parties managed to enter into settlement negotiations.112 
The Amchem settlement covered two broad types of asbestos 
plaintiffs: those seeking redress of current injury or disease and 
 
 103  James E. Alleman & Brooke T. Mossman, Asbestos Revisited, SCI. AM., July 1997, 
at 70. 
 104  Id. at 70. 
 105  Uses included being woven by the Ancient Greeks into handkerchiefs and 
being placed in schools, office buildings, and ships in the industrial era to guard 
against fires.  Id.  A popular French legend tells of Emperor Charlemagne lighting an 
asbestos tablecloth on fire to intimidate dinner guests.  Id. at 71.  And during World 
War II, the Central Intelligence Agency investigated rumors that the Germans were 
thwarting a global asbestos shortage through their development of a chemical 
substitute.  Id. at 72. 
 106  Id. at 72–73. 
 107  BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 41 (5th ed. 2005). 
 108  Id. at 102.  See also id. at 97 (noting that “the average time from onset of 
exposure to development of cancer was 25 years for lung cancer with asbestosis, and 
30 years for peritoneal cancer”). 
 109  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997). 
 110  Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS 
LITIG. 2–3 (1991)). 
 111  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599. 
 112  Id. 
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those—so-called “exposure-only” plaintiffs—seeking the equivalent of 
insurance against possible future harm.113  The settlement provided, 
inter alia, for varying payouts for currently injured class members, and 
guaranteed recovery for exposure-only plaintiffs if and when they 
developed symptoms of an asbestos-related disease.114  Eventually, the 
district court approved both class certification and the settlement.115  
The Third Circuit, however, in the consolidated case of Georgine v. 
Amchem Products, Inc., reversed on a number of grounds, including 
lack of adequate class representation.116 
In the Amchem cases, the named class representatives included 
both currently injured class members and exposure-only class 
members.117  No separately represented subclasses were created.118  
This engendered a situation where currently injured class 
representatives were acting on behalf of absent, exposure-only class 
members and exposure-only class representatives were acting on 
behalf of absent, currently injured class members.119 
The Court held these two groups to be in inherent conflict, 
neither of which could adequately represent the other.120  Those class 
members seeking redress of current injuries or disease would chase 
the highest possible current payouts.121  In contrast, exposure-only 
plaintiffs—having not yet suffered cognizable injury—would seek 
minimal immediate recovery for the class.122  This group would lobby 
for inflation protection and provisions that account for the possibility 
that future and more sensitive medical testing could reveal as-yet 
undiscovered harmful effects of asbestos exposure.123  As a result of 
these powerful conflicts of interest, the Third Circuit reversed the 
approval of the settlement, and the Supreme Court affirmed.124 
In Dewey II, the Third Circuit returned to Amchem, grounding 
Footnote 19’s proposition in a quote from the Supreme Court: “The 
 
 113  Id. at 602–04. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 116  83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 117  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 625–26. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–26. 
 124  Id. at 629. 
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disparity between the currently injured and exposure-only categories 
of plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category are not made 
insignificant by the District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets 
suffice to pay claims under the settlement.”125  In other words, the 
structural adequacy (the combination of currently injured and 
exposure-only plaintiffs into one class) did not, ostensibly, result in 
financial prejudice (as the defendant parties would always be able to 
afford payments to all harmed class members).  Reversal was 
nevertheless required.126  Indeed, in Footnote 19, the Third Circuit 
used this exact sentence to assert that “[t]he fact that the stars 
aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually damaged 
does not permit representative plaintiffs to bypass structural 
requirements.”127  It is with that proposition that this Comment takes 
issue. 
B. Escaping Amchem 
Reversing approval of class action settlements for representative 
inadequacy that did not cause harm wastes both judicial and party 
resources.  As mentioned in the Introduction, federal dockets are 
already strained, especially in light of ever-increasing diversity class 
action litigation.128 
Where the ordinarily invaluable structural requirements of Rule 
23(a) are not met, but the “stars align” and class members are not 
monetarily prejudiced as a result,129 appellate courts should let these 
 
 125  Id. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.  The assessment that the 
asbestos defendants would be able to meet any obligations was based on reports 
submitted to the district court by financial experts.  Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).  The 
reports examined the financial viability of the various defendant entities, using an 
initial ten-year period as a benchmark.  Id.  The reports asserted that, for eleven of 
the defendants, there was only a 2% chance of default under the weight of all claims.  
Id.  For another eleven defendants, the chance of default was 5%.  Id.  And, finally, 
for the remaining two defendants, the chance of default was 25%.  Id. 
 126  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 190. 
 127  Id. at 189 n.19. 
 128  See supra text accompanying notes 1–7. 
 129  In the context of civil litigation, the general result of prejudice against a party 
is monetary loss.  Nonetheless, certainly, in the event a structurally inadequate class 
action settlement unfairly prejudices a party in some non-monetary, but tangible, way, 
the same analysis should apply and the settlement should still be overturned.  
Similarly, while the focus of this Comment is the so-called “adequacy requirement,” 
the broader argument—that harmless procedural failings should not automatically 
require appellate reversal of a class action settlement—could also be applied to other 
Rule 23 requirements, however unlikely they are to be the subject of such a reversal. 
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settlements stand, rather than upset the finality of carefully 
considered and judicially approved agreements.  Below, Part VI of 
this Comment suggests the evidentiary “harmless error doctrine” as a 
potential legal framework for class action settlement appellate review. 
Still, even assuming acceptance of this framework, it is necessary 
for courts to sidestep the proposition espoused in Footnote 19 of 
Dewey II.  As such, this Comment argues that the Third Circuit 
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem.  Moving 
beyond the solitary passage quoted in Footnote 19, a broader 
examination of the holding in Amchem reveals a more complicated 
picture of the settlement at issue there—a  picture that exposes 
fundamental differences between it and the settlement in Dewey II.  
This being the case, other appellate courts should decline to follow 
the approach of the Third Circuit.  And the Third Circuit itself—
perhaps even the Supreme Court—should step in to reverse course of 
this precedent. 
Part V(B)(i) examines the Third Circuit’s misinterpretation, 
Part V(B)(ii) uses another section of Dewey II to further undermine 
Footnote 19, and Part V(B)(iii) adds an additional policy argument 
to the reasons why the footnote’s rule should be abandoned. 
1. Dewey II Incorrectly Interpreted Amchem 
Again, recall that the Third Circuit cited to the following 
statement in Amchem to undergird its own holding: “The disparity 
between the currently injured and exposure-only categories of 
plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category, are not made 
insignificant by the District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets 
suffice to pay claims under the settlement.”130  Unlike in Footnote 19, 
however, the Supreme Court continued: 
The terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation 
decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit 
defendants’ liability.  For example, as earlier described, the 
settlement includes no adjustment for inflation; only a few 
claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and loss-of-
consortium claims are extinguished with no 
 
 130  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.  The presence 
of two potentially misaligned groups of class members in both cases certainly makes 
comparisons between the two tempting, if not inevitable.  See Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he settlement does more than simply provide a general recovery fund.  Rather, 
it makes important judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different 
kinds of plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over others.”). 
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compensation.131 
Thus, unlike what can be gleaned from Footnote 19, the Supreme 
Court did not rest its decision only on the grounds of some 
theoretical structural deficiency.  Present in that settlement 
agreement was a structural deficiency that manifested in financial 
harm to one group over another. 
By way of example, “the [Amchem] settlement includes no 
adjustment for inflation.”132  Any future injuries that exposure-only 
class members claimed would not be upwardly adjusted for the 
always-decreasing value of money.133  This is a very tangible 
disadvantage.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, since 
1997—the year Amchem was decided—the value of $1.00 has inflated 
by as much as 44%.134  For plaintiffs needing treatment for cancer or 
other diseases, this is quite a significant jump.135  And added to the 
other shortcomings mentioned by the Court, this settlement plainly 
and financially favored the then injured plaintiffs at the expense of 
the exposure-only group.136  Indeed, the “undivided set of 
representatives could not adequately protect the discrete interests of 
both currently afflicted and exposure-only claimants.”137 
Contrast this with the statement made in Dewey II: “The fact that 
the stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually 
damaged does not permit representatives to bypass structural 
requirements.”138  This assertion is unqualified and, given the more 
 
 131  Id. at 626–27.  
 132  Id. at 627. 
 133  Id. 
 134  CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (illustrating the purchasing 
power of $1.00 in 2012). 
 135  But see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 638 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An inflation 
adjustment might not be as valuable as the majority assumes if most plaintiffs are old 
and not worried about receiving compensation decades from now.  There are, of 
course, strong arguments as to its value.  But that disagreement is one that this Court 
is poorly situated to resolve.”). 
 136  Id. at 611. 
 137  Id.  To a degree, even the Third Circuit acknowledges some of the inherent 
differences between the settlement in Amchem and that in Dewey II.  See Dewey v. 
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170, 185 (3d. Cir. 2012) (“This 
case bears some resemblance to Amchem and raises some of the same concerns. . . . 
This resulted in a misalignment of interests–certain members of the class had an 
incentive to pursue protections for future claims, while the representative plaintiffs 
lacked any such incentive.  Here, on the other hand, the alignment of interests is not 
so starkly problematic.”). 
 138  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. 
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complex picture in Amchem, not a natural interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s holding.139 
Yes, in Amchem—like in Dewey—there was a structural 
representative adequacy problem with the division of the class.140  And 
yes, in Amchem—like in Dewey—this structural representative adequacy 
problem did not seem to bear practically on the size of the settlement 
negotiated; there was enough money to go around.141  But in 
Amchem—unlike in Dewey—the problem did produce a tangible 
detriment to the inadequately represented faction.142  “[T]he 
settlement unfairly disadvantaged those without currently 
compensable conditions in that it failed to adjust for inflation or to 
account for changes, over time, in medical understanding.”143 
 
 139  On this point, by way of devil’s advocacy, it is necessary to posit that a similar 
substantive qualification could theoretically be asserted about the settlement at issue 
in Dewey II as well.  It is certainly possible that the Rule 23(a)(4) deficiency did 
indeed cause the residual group tangible, financial harm.  There was obviously a 
conceptual scenario in which the $8 million fund was completely or partially 
exhausted by the reimbursement group, leaving either nothing or reduced pro rata 
recoveries for the residual group.  See, e.g., supra note 63.  Though high recovery 
rates are not common, were not expected here, and indeed did not manifest, an 
argument could be made that the terms of the settlement were facially unfair.  The 
Third Circuit raises this possibility in another footnote: “there remained a chance, 
however remote, that the fund would not be sufficiently large.”  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 
187 n.15.  Indeed, the actual terms of the restructured settlement considered this 
possibility and made some adjustments to the contours of the $8 million fund.  
Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am. (Dewey III), 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (2012).  The fund 
remained capped at $8 million only to the degree that, were this amount not to be 
exhausted by the end of the claims period, any differential would go to charity, as was 
provided for in the original agreement.  Id. See also supra note 63.  What changed 
from the first settlement to the new settlement, however, was that if this $8 million 
fund was exhausted, Volkswagen would fully pay any timely claims in excess of the $8 
million.  Dewey III, 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (2012).  Practically, the $8 million was 
always expected to suffice, and appeared to be more than enough to pay all claims 
even by the promulgation of Dewey III.  See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.  
Still, this modification technically created an unlimited claims fund. On its face, this 
argument then makes the above assertion—that there is analytical space between 
Amchem and Dewey II—a theoretical straw man.  The text of Footnote 19, however, 
renders this hypothetical irrelevant.  The Third Circuit was unabashed in its 
proposition that “the stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not actually 
damaged.”  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189, n.19.  The thrust of this Comment can 
therefore easily rest solely on that language, notwithstanding any real or imagined 
factual assertions to the contrary. 
 140  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626, quoted in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19. 
 141  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 606.  Additionally, the Amchem settlement’s other limitations on recovery, 
see supra text accompanying note 131, such as the extinguishment of loss-of-
consortium claims can also be conceptualized as financial symptoms of inadequate 
class representation.  Individuals with unique interests are best cared for by unique 
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In Amchem, the Rule 23(a)(4) deficiency was not merely 
structural; it was actual.  Therefore, Footnote 19’s use of Amchem to 
undergird its automatic-reversal-for-structure proposition was 
misplaced.  This doctrine should therefore be ignored or overturned. 
2. The Language of Dewey II is Inherently Contradictory 
Certainly, “the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental 
importance to the rule of law.”144  For the sake of a predictable legal 
system, courts must follow precedent.145  Yet, although “[t]he 
obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity . . . a contrary 
necessity marks its outer limit.”146  The Supreme Court has not been 
shy about the malleability of precedent: 
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our 
own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a 
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.  At 
the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself 
felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so 
clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason 
doomed.147 
It is to the “other extreme” that this Comment appeals. 
Adding to the case for the rejection of Footnote 19, the Third 
Circuit itself—in Dewey II—wavered from its stance.  “Obviously,” the 
Third Circuit qualified, “not all intra-class conflicts will defeat the 
adequacy requirement.”148  And, when discussing the general law of 
Rule 23(a)(4), the Third Circuit emphasized that only “fundamental” 
representative inadequacies will defeat the class.149  The court directly 
cited the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals to 
help define this term: “A fundamental conflict exists where some 
[class] members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that 
benefited other members of the class.”150  In fact, this type of 
 
representatives. 
 144  Welch v. Tex. Dep’t. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987). 
 145  See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Paul Gewitz & Michael Ansaldi, The Case Law System 
in America, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 989, 991 (1988).   
 146  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 147  Id. at 854.   
 148  Dewey II, 681 F.3d 170, 184 (3d. Cir. 2012).   
 149  Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 
(11th Cir. 2003) (“Significantly, the existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat 
a party’s claim to class certification: the conflict must be a ‘fundamental’ one going 
to the specific issues in controversy.”)). 
 150  350 F.3d at 1189, cited in Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 184 (emphasis added). 
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qualification is not uncommon in the relevant case law.151 
Footnote 19 lost sight of this clear tempering of the adequacy 
requirement, tempering that the Third Circuit itself embraced.  At 
best, this undermines Footnote 19.  At worst, it renders the judgment 
in Dewey II inherently paradoxical.  Either way, it further justifies 
jettisoning Footnote 19 and the proposition for which it stands.152 
3. Professional Class Action Settlement Objectors 
In addition to the general policy of not unnecessarily 
overburdening federal courts, one specific, recent trend in class 
action litigation begs for fewer—not more—procedural hurdles to 
the finalization of class action settlements.  Though reversals of class 
action settlements may still be relatively rare,153 the role of objectors 
in settlement proceedings is increasingly significant and 
 
 151  See, e.g., Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“For a conflict of interest to defeat the adequacy requirement, that conflict must be 
fundamental.”) (emphasis added); Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“An absence of material conflicts of interest between the named 
plaintiffs and their counsel with other class members is central to adequacy and, in 
turn, to due process for absent members of the class.”) (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler 
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)).  Due process 
concerns, as noted in Rodriguez and Hanlon are certainly well taken.  The heart of 
Rule 23 is protection of absent class members’ interests.  See supra Part III.  Yet, such 
protection is not the only policy at issue in the class action settlement approval 
process.  Justice delayed, as the maxim goes, is justice denied.  And vague notions of 
due process should not require unnecessary delay for non-existent financial gain. 
 152  As an aside, an argument—though admittedly a weak one—could be made for 
Footnote 19 being relegated to dicta.  The fact that this assertion is housed in a 
footnote, however, is not necessarily an indication of the dividing line between 
precedent and non-binding dicta.  Even if Footnote 19 was the only source in Dewey II 
for the current issue, for even the first-year law student, Footnote 4 of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. serves as a lasting monument to the potential centrality of 
footnotes in legal analysis.  304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).  See also Louis Lusky, Footnote 
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).  And—far 
from the ultimate result in Dewey II not being dependent on the subject of Footnote 
19—a judgment demanding reversal of this settlement, even where no additional 
monetary relief would be afforded, was central to Dewey II.  681 F.3d at 189 n.19.  It 
may be somewhat easier to assign the relevant statements in Amchem to dicta, as that 
reversal turned on a number of issues.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 628 (1997) (“[W]e have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the 
requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation.”) 
(emphasis added).  Still, a case turning on multiple dispositive issues also does not 
render each tangential to the judgment.  And, clearly, adequacy of representation 
was fundamental to the reversal in Amchem.  Either way, the gravamen of Dewey II is 
likely too intertwined with Footnote 19 for it to be considered dicta. 
 153  See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 80– 86 (1996). 
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controversial.154  Rule 23(e)(5) permits “[a]ny class member [to] 
object to the [settlement] if it requires court approval.”155 
Certainly, objectors serve an important conceptual purpose in 
making the class representatives accountable to the class as a whole.156  
But objectors are also infamously unpopular participants in the 
settlement process.157  They can cause delay for the sake of delay, 
essentially extorting class representatives and their counsel into 
receiving payoffs to avoid further disruption of the process.158  So-
called “professional objectors” have been labeled “the least popular 
litigation participants in the history of civil procedure.”159  In fact, one 
commentator noted, “objectors are as welcome in the courtroom as is 
the guest at a wedding ceremony who responds affirmatively to the 
minister’s question, ‘Is there anyone here who opposes this 
marriage?’”160 
Considering the existence and growing proliferation of 
professional objectors, courts should be especially wary of placing any 
more procedural impediments in the path of class action settlements.  
Footnote 19 is one such impediment.  Its effect is to render viable 
objections that put money in the pockets of objectors’ attorneys 
alone.  Giving objectors the power and encouragement to object 
when they are the only parties who will benefit financially, only fuels 
the cottage industry of objecting for its own sake.161 
 
 154  See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: 
What to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865 (2012); Edward Brunet, Class Action 
Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 
(2003). 
 155  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). 
 156  Brunet, supra note 154, at 408–09 (“Informational input from objectors 
regarding a proposed settlement could, in theory, improve the monitoring problem.  
By definition, the objector is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed settlement and 
then investing resources to either improve the settlement or reject the settlement.”). 
See also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563 
(D.N.J. 2003) (objectors contributed to an increase of approximately $56 million in 
recovery for class members). 
 157  Lopatka & Smith, supra note 154, at 867. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Brunet, supra note 154, at 411. 
 160  Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 REG. 4 (1997). 
 161  It is worth mentioning that Ted Frank, founder and president of the Center 
for Class Action Fairness, was the lead attorney behind the objection at issue in Dewey 
II.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Volkswagen Group of Am, Inc. 
(Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-3618(L), 10-3651(XAP), 10-
3652(XAP), 10-3798), 2011 WL 4975416 (“Mr. Frank [is] the appointed champion of 
the West objectors.”).  The Center for Class Action Fairness has, in the past, been 
negatively labeled a professional objector, though Mr. Frank disputes the label.  See, 
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VI. HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE 
As already noted, in place of Footnote 19’s reversal-for-
structural-deficiency rule, courts should instead apply an already 
ubiquitous framework for appellate review: the harmless error 
doctrine.  Though this principle largely governs evidentiary, trial, and 
criminal law, it can easily be applied to the current context. 
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, “[a] party may 
claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error 
affects a substantial right of the party.”162  In the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, harmless error is defined as “[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights.”163  All 
fifty states have similar provisions, which are generally interpreted to 
mean that reversals for evidentiary error are only appropriate if the 
error can be shown to have harmed the appealing party.164  And the 
Uniform Probate Code is pushing for this doctrine to be applied to 
improperly executed wills as well.165 
Furthermore, the harmless error doctrine is so ingrained in 
American jurisprudence that even constitutional trial errors need not 
automatically result in appellate reversal.166  True, “there are some 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error.”167  And those errors that demand 
automatic, unqualified, reversal include a denial of a criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel,168 exclusion of members of a 
defendant’s race from grand jury proceedings,169 and a right to public 
trial.170  But aside from these exceptions, and a small number of 
 
e.g., Daniel Fisher, A Lawyer Who Tries to Block Settlements, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2009, 6:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/outfront-tort-consumers-lawyer 
-tries-to-block-settlements.html (“Frank is ‘a professional objector,’ fumes Stephen 
Garcia, lead attorney on a suit against Motorola . . . [But w]hen pushed, Garcia can’t 
name a case where Frank earned a fee; Frank says all of his objections so far have cost 
him money.”).  Instead, Frank styles himself, and his organization, as a bulwark 
against class action settlements that unfairly benefit attorneys at the expense of class 
members.  See, e.g., Rachel M. Zahorsky, Unsettling Advocate, 96 A.B.A. J. 30. See also 
CENTER FOR CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS, 
http://centerforclassactionfairness.blogspot.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 162  FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
 163  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 164  See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
 165  UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-503 (amended 2010). 
 166  Id. at 22–23. 
 167  Id. at 23. 
 168  See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 169  See generally Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
 170  See generally Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
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others,171 “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”172 
This dividing line—between errors that can be overlooked as 
harmless and those so fundamental that they require automatic 
reversal—was succinctly described by Professor Charles Ogletree, Jr., 
in his article Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error 
to Coerced Confessions.173  “To the Fulminante majority,” wrote Ogletree, 
referencing a landmark Supreme Court case for harmless error 
analysis, 
a trial error seems to be one for which we can sometimes 
know for sure whether it has caused inaccuracy in a trial 
outcome, and a structural error seems to be one for which 
we can never know with any certainty.  This artificial 
distinction, however, is really one of degree, not of kind.174 
Said differently, an error only requires automatic reversal if the 
appellate court cannot at all discern if the outcome of the underlying 
trial would have been different but for the error. 
Thus, Footnote 19 begs the following question: did the error 
(the division of the class members into the two groups) actually affect 
the outcome (the ultimate financial recovery)? 
This Comment has already demonstrated that the answer is no.  
Nothing substantial would have changed had the error not occurred.  
Nothing substantial did change.  The settlement in Dewey I should not 
have been disturbed.  And subsequent judicially approved settlements 
in analogous circumstances should not be disturbed either. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit spoke of line drawing.175  It chastised the 
district court for certifying a class and approving a settlement that 
violated Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement of adequate representation.176  
It claimed that those drawing the line were not poised to do so with 
the interests of the whole class in mind.177  But if the Third Circuit’s 
 
 171  See generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When 
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1177 n.36 (1995). 
 172  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991). 
 173  105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991). 
 174  Id. at 162. 
 175  Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Dewey II), 681 F.3d 170, 177–78 (3d. 
Cir. 2012) (“It was this line-drawing exercise that exacerbated the adequacy problem 
here . . . That is, every plaintiff had an incentive to draw the dividing line just 
beneath their model run, placing as many cars as possible into the residual group.”). 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
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own words are to be believed, this was truly a line drawn in the sand.  
No class members were likely to be prejudiced by the settlement as 
was written, and none were.178 
In Amchem, the Court correctly upheld the rejection of the 
settlement agreement at issue because it treated one class of plaintiffs 
unfairly.179  Because of the inadequate representation of counsel, the 
group of victims with exposure-only claims was set to receive a lesser 
award.180  The fact that the defendants possessed enough money to 
pay both classes of plaintiff was inapposite.181 
In Dewey II, the Third Circuit took an offhand remark in the 
Amchem decision out of context.  In failing to recognize that Dewey was 
distinguishable, the Third Circuit misread the Court and incorrectly 
expanded the scope of Amchem.  And the resulting doctrine, 
expressed in Footnote 19, adds pressure to overtaxed federal courts 
and emboldens professional objectors.  Dewey II’s automatic-reversal-
for-structural-problem rule is incorrect, bad policy, and should be 
overruled. 
The stars aligned.  Isn’t that enough? 
 
 
 178  One final anticipated counterargument, similar in nature to what is discussed 
supra, in note 139, is that the original settlement did not sufficiently notify the 
residual claimants of their rights.  That is, the original notice to class members 
described the differences between the reimbursement and residual groups, and the 
updated settlement required notifying the former-residual claimants that they could 
now seek recovery from the $8 million fund in the first instance.  Dewey v. 
Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (2012).  This is an advantage, however, 
that relates to time and nature of recovery, not monetary size of recovery.  And even 
were this benefit quantifiable—which, itself, requires some logical leaps—Footnote 
19 does away with any damaging effect such benefits might have on the thrust of this 
Comment.  As far as the Third Circuit was concerned, “class members’ interests were 
not actually damaged.”  Dewey II, 681 F.3d at 189 n.19.  It was on this assumption that 
the reversal rested. 
 179  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–27 (1997). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
